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[Sac. No. 6892. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1960.] 
ADOLPH D. LAUX et a1., Respondents, v. WILLIAM J. 
FREED et a1., Appellants. 
[1] Easements-Kinds of Easements: Oreation-By Severance of 
Tenements.-The principle embodied in Civ. Code, § 1104, de-
claring what easements pass with property, and its applica-
tion are not limited to the list of servitudes and corresponding 
easements enumerated in Civ. Code, § 801, since the easements 
encompassed within § 1104 embrace every burden which by 
virtue of the manner of use has been imposed on the portion 
of the estate not granted in favor of the portion granted. 
[2] Id. -Mode and Extent of User. - Where it affirmatively ap-
peared from the evidence that, from the time the parties 
as partners first acquired range land until they divided 
it by the flip of a coin some five years later and erected a bound-
ary fence the following year, both plaintiff (the winner of the 
northern portion) and defendant (who received the southern 
portion) and their invitees and guests had hunted the entire 
range land and during a portion of that time had jointly leased 
out the deer hunting rights on a commercial basis, and that, 
until plaintiff partner won the toss of the coin and knew that 
the northern portion would be his, his interest was that the 
[2) See Oal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 23 et seq.; Am..Jur., Easements, 
§ 112 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Easements, §§ 3, 16; [2] Easementl5, 
§ 29; [3-5] Partnership, § 36; [6, 8] Easements, § 14; [7] Deeds, 
§ 175; [9] Contracts, § 153; [10-12] Easements, § 34. 
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party who receh'ed the other portion (the back half or "brush 
patch") should likewise receive an unlimited right of way over 
the private acc£ss road from the northern to the southern por-
tion, and where both parcels and the deeded right of way over 
the road continued to be used for deer hunting for some four 
yellrs after the partnership dissolution, after which plaintiff 
complained that "these people coming across interfered with 
the hunting .on" his own parcel after the partition, and for that 
reason tardily sought to have a court write into the deed which 
he had prepared limitations on the use of his former partner 
which he asserted were discussed but were omitted from the 
deed, the provisions of Civ. Code, § 1104, should apply in favor 
of defendant to the end that he be permitted to continue the 
full use of the right of way in the manner it was used before 
partition of the property. 
[3] Partnership-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Relation. 
-As partners in the ownership and operation of the entire 
range property before it was divided, plaintiff and defendant 
bore a confidential and fiduciary relationship to each other. 
Neither had the right to take unfair advantage or secure an 
undue bcnefit, and the burden is on the one seeking an advan-
tage to show complete good faith and fairness toward the other. 
[4] Id.-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Relation.-The 
duty of good faith required of partners and the burden of show-
ing it extend to the dissolution and liquidation of partnership 
affairs, as well as to the sale by one partner to another of his 
interest in the partnership. 
[5] Id. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - If 
plaintiff partner, who drafted the right of way deed on par-
tition of range land into two pOl·tions following dissolution of 
the pUl·tnership, intended that use of such right of way be 
limited or restrict I'd, particularly more limited or restricted 
than during the period of partnership ownership of the entire 
property, it was his duty to so disclose by incorporating any 
such limitlltions in the grant itself, rather than some four years 
after thc dissolution, and after continuing use of the right of 
way as granted, seeking court assistance to prevent defendant 
frolll milking full use in the customary manner of the way 
granted. 
[6] Easements - Creation - Express Grant - Construction.-The 
rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally, such 
as that a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee and 
a reservation in the grant is to be interpreted in favor of the 
grantor (Civ. Code, § 1069), apply with full force and effect 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 10. 
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to instruments conveying easements or similar rights or 
privileges. 
[7] Deeds-Evidence-Parol Evidence.--If the language of a deed 
is plain, certain and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor 
surrounding facts and circumstances will be considered to add 
to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate 
conveyed. 
[8] Easements - Creation - Express Grant-Construction.-Any 
uncertainty in a grant to grantees "as Joint Tenants" did not 
apply to the property conveyed, where it was described as "A 
right of way over a road as presently constructed along the 
East Branch of Sand Creek, in the East half of Section 18" etc. 
[9] Contracts - Interpretation - Construction in Favor of One 
Party.-An instrument in writing is construed most strongly 
against the party who drafted it or caused it to be drafted. 
(Civ. Code, § 1654.) 
[10] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Construction of Grant. 
-Where it was the intention of the parties, on dissolving a 
partnership, to make a substantially equal division, of the range 
property and equipment which they owned as partners, and 
plaintiff's own testimony further showed that following the 
toss of a coin-which gave him the northern portion of the 
property-defendant requested two further rights of way 
in addition to the existing one from the northern to the south-
ern portion, that the parties argued out the matter including 
use for deer hunting, and that plaintiff caused the deed to the 
right of way to be prepared in the form it was, which contained 
no limitation as to either purpose or use by defendant, if under 
such circumstances plaintiff had intended (and the partners had 
agreed) that defendant himself, and hunters invited or licensed 
by defendant, were to be barred from use of the existing right 
of way, it was incumbent on plaintiff to have caused the deed 
he prepared and delivered to so state. In any event, the prior 
negotiations which preceded the written document were merged 
into and superseded by the writing, and could not be resorted to 
by plaintiff to so limit the tenns of the grant as to deprive 
his fonner partner of the right to continue using the road as 
it had been used consistently before dissolution of the part-
nership. 
[11] ld.-Mode and Extent of User-Construction of Grant.-A 
grant in general terms of an easement of way will ordinarily 
be construed as creating a general right of way capable of use 
in connection with the dominant tenement for all reasonable 
purposes. 
[12] ld. - Mode and Extent of User - Construction of Grant. - A 
grant of a right of way unrestricted as to purpose is a grant 
of a way to be used for any purpose. 
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APPEAL from portion of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Colusa County. Wright L. Callender, Judge.- Reversed. 
Action involving the extent of a grant of right of way by a 
deed from plaintiffs to defendants. Portion of judgment en-
joining defendant's use of the right of way other than as 
limited bY.the judgment, reversed. 
Ralph W. Rutledge and Richard E. Patton for Appellants. 
Donald W. Littlejohn and Florence J. Westfall for Re-
spondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-This is an appeal by defendants from only 
that portion of a judgment which purports to alter the terms 
of, and place limits on the use of a right of way granted by, 
a deed to them from plaintiffs, and which enjoins use of the 
right of way other than as limited by the judgment. We have 
concluded that the trial court's judgment results in varying 
the terms of the written grant, rather than merely interpreting 
it, and is without support in the record, and that the portion of 
the judgment appealed from should therefore be reversed. For 
convenience, plaintiff husband and defendant husband will 
hereinafter sometimes be referred to as plaintiff and defend-
ant, respectively. 
In August, 1947, plaintiff and defendant acquired a.<; part-
ners certain range land in Colusa County, California. Plain-
tiff testified that during the deer hunting seasons of 1947 
through 1951, the parties and their invitees and guests hunted 
deer upon the range land. For the season of 1949 or 1950 they 
leased out the deer llUnting rights, such leasing being referred 
to as "commercial hunting"; plaintiff and defendant, how-
ever, reserved the right to also hunt on the property with their 
own guests. Plaintiff did not know "how many permits or 
licenses" to hunt were sold by the lessee in that year. 
Until 1952 the parties owned and "farmed or operated this 
property as partners. " In that year by agreement the partner-
ship was dissolved and the land divided into two parcels. As 
above shown, for five or six years preceding dissolution of the 
partnership both parcels had been used seasonally for deer 
hunting and the road which is the subject of the right of way 
here disputed had been used by the partners and their guests 
or licensees. (Likewise, as hereinafter shown, both parcels-
• .Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
516 LAux v. FREED [53 C.2d 
and the deeded right of way over the road-continued to be 
used for deer hunting for some four years after the dissolu-
tion.) It was (at least inferentially) mutually intended that 
the two parcels should be substantially equal; i.e., that the-
division should be reasonably fair to each equal partner; and 
it was agreed that the flip of a coin would determine which 
portion each partner should receive. As partners, as herein-
after discussed in more detail, the parties were in a fiduciary 
relationship and each owed to the other the highest good faith 
and fairness. Plaintiff won the toss and chose the northerly 
parcel; defendant thereby received the southerly part, also 
known as the" back half of the range" or the" brush patch." 
For many years there had been a private road (the road 
hereinabove mentioned) crossing the northerly portion which 
road ,vas used as a means of access to the southerly portion 
and which at the time of the division of the land was the only 
road into the back part of the latter portion, although there 
were" other ways to get into the place. " Prior to the division, 
and as a part of the dissolution agreement pertaining to 
equalization of value and accessibility of each parcel, the part-
ners agreed that "whoever got" this back half, or "southerly 
parcel, " of the range, should also receive and have a right of 
way across the northerly parcel over the private access road. 
As a part of the theretofore orally agreed upon division de-
fendant, to whom the back (southerly) part went, received 
from plaintiff a grant deed to c. all the real property ... de-
scribed as follows: 
•• A right of way over a road as presently constructed along 
the East Branch of Sand Creek, in the [legal description]." 
Plaintiff, himself, prepared the deed following oral diseussions 
,vith his partner. No limitation as to either purpose or use 
by defendant, of the right of way so conveyed is stated in the 
deed. 
Following the partition in 1952, plaintiff and defendant and 
their iuvitees and guests hunted upon each other's land as 
well as upon their own during the deer season of that year. 
In 1953, however, a boundary fence was erected and there-
after each party hunted only upon his own lands. During the 
1953 through 1955 se-asons defendant and his invite-es and 
guests, apparcntly as had been contemplated by the parties 
at the time of partition, used the right of way over the road 
al'ross plaintiff's land to reach the land of defendant. In 1956 
both defendant and plaintiff leased "exclusive" deer hunting 
.rights "commercially" on their respective lands to individual 
) 
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lessees. The lessee of defendant's land "sold memberships" 
for hunting purposes and, pursuant to instructions by de-
fendant, told the deer hunters that they were to use the right 
of way to reach the land. Inferribly it was at this time that 
plaintiff became dissatisfied with defendant's use of the right 
of way. He thereupon (some four years after the partnership 
dissolution and division of the property) brought this suit, 
alleging that the right of way was granted "for the sole pur-
pose of the use of the defendants to reach their property, and 
also for ... driving and hauling cattle and feed across said 
right-of-way to reach defendants' property," and seeking to 
limit its use accordingly. 
Althou2h as hereinabove mentioned the defendants appeal 
from only that portion of the judgment which purports to 
limit the extent of the granted right of way, it makes for a 
clearer understanding of the case to briefly mention other 
issues that were tried and resolved. The :first cause of action 
alleged: "That on or about the 29th day of August, 1952, the 
plaintiffs executed and delivered to the defendants a right-
of-way as follows, to wit: For Value Received, Adolph D. 
Laux and Joyce H. Laux, his wife, grant to William J. Freed 
and Bertell F. Freed, his wife, as Joint Tenants, all the real 
property situate in the County of Colusa, State of California, 
described as follows: A right of. way over a road as presently 
constructed along the East Branch of Sand Creek, in the East 
half of Section 18 ... That pursuant to the provisions of said 
right-of-way defendants were entitled to use said road only 
as constructed and existing as of August 29, 1952." Plaintiffs 
further alleged that after the partition of the property and 
the delivery of the respective deeds from defendants to plain-
tiffs and from plaintiffs to defendants the defendants "changed 
the course of said road from its original location of 1952 as it 
was constructed when the said right-of-way was granted, " and 
that defendants "constructed a bridge over an excavation 
made by the defendants" and changed the course of the stream. 
Plaintiffs also alleged that in 1956 the defendants commenced 
the construction of another bridge to replace the previous one 
which had been washed out and in process of reconstruction 
of the bridge took materials from plaintiffs' land. 
Plaintiffs in their second cause of action alleged the granting 
of the right of way and the terms hereinabove quoted and 
further averred: "That the said right-of-way hereinabove 
described grant.ed by the plaintiffs to the defendants was 
granted for the sole purpose of the use of the defendants to 
) 
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reach their property, and also for the purpose of the defend-
ants driving and hauling cattle and feed acro:~s said right-
of-way to reach defendants' property. Tkat in the year 1956, 
tke defendants leased their aforesaid described real property 
for deer hunting purposes during the deer hunting season of 
1956 j that the lessee of the hunting privileges of said premises 
has and is issuing memberships to numerous indh'iduals for 
the purpose of hunting on the defendants' aforedescribed 
property. That the plaintiffs in the ycar 1956 leased their 
aforedescribed premises for hunting during the deer season of 
1956." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs further alleged tkat at the 
point the right of way commences on plaintiff's land they 
erected a gate and locked it with a ckain and lock, delivering 
to defendants a key for the purpose of entry. "That since the 
commencement of deer hunting season in the year 1956, and 
pursuant to the specific instructions of the defendants, a large 
number of people who have purchased hunting rights on de-
fendants' land are entering plaintiffs' land over the aforesaid 
right-of-way granted to the defendants; that plaintiffs have 
requested the defendants to cease delivering said keys to said 
deer hunters and that defendants instruct said deer hunters 
not to cross plaintiffs' land j but defendants ... fail and refuse, 
to do so; that said hunters are entering the land of the plain-
tiffs at the instruction of the defendants; (tkat tke entry of 
.aid hunters upon plaintiffs' land is not for the primary pur-
pose of gaining access to the defendants' land, but for the pur-
pose of hunting on plaintiffs' land enroute to the defendants' 
land.l11) • • • Tkat tke p1·esent use of said premises by the 
lessees of the defendants' is an unauthorized change of burde11 
of the easement and is harmful to tke plaintiffs' in tkat it has 
disrupted the hunting of the plaintiffs' lessee; that plaintiffs' 
lessee threatens to cancel his lease because of the use 0/ the 
right-o/-way by defendants' hunters." (Italics added.) 
The trial court found that prior to the year 1952 plaintiffs 
and defendants jointly owned all of the real property con-
cerned in this litigation j "that in the year 1952 Plaintiffs 
Laux and Defendants Freed [by mutual agreement] parti-
tioned said property, Plaintiffs Laux [by the toss of a coin] 
becoming the owners of the land" referred to by the parties 
as the northerly parcel and defendants Freed becoming the 
owners of the southerly part, or "brush patch. " To effect such 
1The record ahows that on motion of plaintiffs this elause in paren-
theses was stricken from plaintiffs' eopy; but it remaina as a faet 
averred under oath for sipmeanee in understanding .the issues here. 
) 
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conveyance each of the parties delivered to the other a deed 
conveying the grantors' respective interests. In addition to 
the deed from plaintiffs to defendants conveying the southerly 
portion the court found that plaintiffs conveyed to defendants 
a right of way in the language hereinabpve quoted. 
As to the issues specifically presented by the pleadings the 
findings were as follows: ., That the words • as presently con-
structed' appearing in the above mentioned grant of right of 
way is hereby construed to refer to the direction and location 
of the right of way, and said words do not negative a secondary 
easement to maintain or repair"; that the defendants did 
not change the course or location of the road upon "said right 
of way from its original location in 1952 as said road was lo-
cated when the said right of way was granted"; that the de-
fendants did construct a bridge in the fall of 1953 which was 
washed out in 1955, and in 1956 defendants commenced con-
struction of a new bridge which new bridge is improperly 
constructed so that the bridge itself and its approaches are 
hazardous. Purporting to support the specific provision of 
the judgment from which the appeal is taken the court found 
that the right of way in the language hereinabove quoted "was 
granted for the sole purpose of the use by Defendants Freed 
for moving livestock, farm machinery, hay, feed, other stock 
raising and farm goods and chattels to and from their property 
lying south of Plaintiffs' property. (6) That in the year 1956, 
the Defendants Freed leased their aforementioned described 
real property for deer hunting purposes during the deer 
hunting season of 1956; that the Lessee of the hunting privi-
leges of said premises issued memberships to numerous indi-
viduals for the purpose of hunting on Defendants' hereinabove 
described property; that since the commencement of deer 
season in 1956, and pursuant to the specific instructions of 
Defendants Freed and their Lessee. said deer hunters, who had 
purchased hunting rights on Defendants' land, entered Plain-
tiffs' land over the aforementioned right of way granted to 
the defendants; that Plaintiffs requested Defendants to cease 
instructing said deer hunters to use such access to Defend-
ants' property j that Defendants failed and refused to permit 
said deer hunters to use any other access to Defendants' prop-
erty and hunting area. (7) A map in evidence shows that De-
fendants have access to their property and hunting area by a 
county road and should they desire to rent hunting privileges 
to third persons, access to said hunting area can be gained by 
the above mentioned road. (8) That the use of Defendants' 
) 
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private right of way over Plaintiffs' property by deer hunters 
has unreasonably increased the burden on the servient tene 
ment; that such lise was not contemplated by the parties at 
the time of the original grant and that such grant was made 
for the sole purpose of permi!ting Defendants to move live-
stock, feed, machinery and stock raising and other farm goods 
and chattels to and from the county road across Plaintiffs' 
land to that of the Defendants. (9) That the use of said right 
of way by the Defendants, their lessee, and third persons, for 
purposes other than moving livestock, feed, machinery, stock 
raising and other farm goods and chattels to and from the 
county road across Plaintiffs' land to that of the Defendants, 
is an unauthorized change in the burden of the easement of 
said right of way." (Italics added.) 
Based on the foregoing findings the judgment enjoins the 
defendants from maintaining or constructing the bridge re-
ferred to in the first cause of action unless the same "be built 
under the supervision ... of an experienced bridge builder ... 
or ... under the supervision of the [county] Road Commis-
sioner," and specifies that H by way of an injunction . .. De-
fendants are ... enjoined ... from use or permitting to be used 
the right of way granted for the purpose of ingress and egress 
to and from their property for commercial hunting privileges 
and that the use of the road is hereby limited to the purposes 
of permitting Defendants to move livestock, farm machinery, 
hay, feed and other stock raising and farming goods and 
chattels to and fram their own property." It is to be observed 
that this injunction absolutely prohibits the defendants (either 
in person or by their invitees) from using the granted right of 
way for any purpose not listed in the judgment. Thus defend-
ants are deprived of a use which had been an incident of the 
right of way road for approximately 10 years: from 1947 to 
1952, before the partition; and from 1952 to 1956, after par-
tition. 
The controlling issue before us is whether the last-quoted 
portion of the injunction so limiting the defendants in the 
use and enjoyment of their easement, can be sustained. 
[ 1 ] In the first place it is to be noted that section 1104 
of the Civil Code provides that "A transfer of real property 
passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor 
thereof an easement to use other real property of the person 
whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the 
same extent as such property was obviously and permanently 
used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit 
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t.hereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or 
completed." (See also Civ. Code, §§ 801, 806; Rest., Property, 
§ 483, pp. 3018-3019.) The long-established principle embodied 
in this section and its application are not limited to the list 
of servitudes and corresponding easements enumerated in 
section 801 of the Civil Code, for the reason that the easements 
encomp8.!!Sed within the provisions of section 1104 "embrace 
every burden which by virtue of the manner of use has been 
imposed upon the portion of the estate not granted in favor 
of the portion granted." (Jersey Farm 00. v. Atlanta Realty 
00. (1912), 164 Cal. 412, 415 [129 P. 593] ; see also Rosebrook 
v. Utz (1941),45 Cal.App.2d 726, 729 [114 P.2d 715].) Here, 
we need not concern ourselves with any question as to whether, 
technically, an easement would attach from the use of the right 
of way over the road during the period of partnership owner-
ship. The significant fact is that the road was so used by the 
partners and their invitees and it was agreed between the 
fiduciaries that the one who drew the "brush patch" (southerly 
portion) should have the right of way along the road over the 
northerly portion. 
[2] Here, although plaintiff, in support of the findings 
and the judgment, relies upon his own testimony that prior 
to partition of the land the parties, then being partners, orally 
discussed and agreed that the right of way would be for the 
limited purposes alleged by plaintiff and found by the trial 
court, plaintiff's testimony, undisputed in this respect, shows 
affirmatively that from the time the parties as partners first 
acquired the land until they divided it by the flip of a coin 
some five years later and erected a boundary fence the follow-
ing year, both plaintiff and defendant and their invitees and 
guests had hunted the entire range land and during a portion 
of that time had jointly leased out the deer hunting rights on 
a commercial basis.2 Until plaintiff partner won the toss of 
the coin and knew which of the two parcels into which the land 
had been divided would be his, his interest was, of course, that 
the party who received the back half or "brush patch" should 
likewise receive an unlimited right of way-at least to the 
extent and for the purposes for which it had been used during 
'Plaintiff testified that during the period he owned the property 
jointly with defendant there was "commercial hunting done on the 
premises ••• it was the summer of either '49 or 'GO ..•• [T]he range 
land was leased out in one of those years to Mr. Al Lawrence"; that 
plaintiff did not "know how many permits or lieen~es tlwt Mr. Lawrence 
Bold in the year that he had the commercial hunting rights on the range." 
) 
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partnership ownership--over the private access road here in 
dispute. His true complaint seems now to be that" these people 
coming across interfered with the hunting on" his own parcel 
after the partition, and for that reason he tardily seeks to have 
a court write into the deed which he had prepared limitations 
on the use of his former partner which he asserts were dis-
cussed but which were omitted from the deed. Under such 
circumstances we believe that the provisions of section 1104 
of the Civil Code should apply in favor of defendant to the 
end that he be permitted to continue the full use of the'right 
of way in the manner it was used before partition of the 
property. 
[3] Manifestly, as partners in the ownership and opera-
tion of the entire property before it was divided, plaintiff and 
defendant bore a confidential and fiduciary relationship to 
each other. (Nelson v. Abraham (1947), 29 Cal.2d 745, 750 
[6] [177 P.2d931]; 37 Cal.Jur.2d 613-614, § 46, and cases 
there cited; 68 C.J.S. 516-517, §76; 40 Am.Jur. 217, §128.) 
As partners, neither had the right to take an unfair advantage 
or secure an undue benefit, and the burden is on the one seek-
ing an advantage to show complete good faith and fairness 
toward the other. [4] The duty of good faith and the 
burden of showing it extend to the dissolution and liquidation 
of partnership affairs, as well as to the sale by one partner 
to another of his interest in the partnership. (Arnold v. 
Arnold (1902), 137 Cal. 291, 296 [70 P. 23]; see also 37 
Cal.Jur.2d 619-621, § 51; 40 Am.Jur. 218, § 129.) [5] It 
follows that if plaintiff, who drafted the right of way deed in 
the present case, intended that use of such right of way be 
limited or restricted, particularly more limited or restricted 
than during the period of partnership ownership of the entire 
property, it was his duty to so disclose by incorporating any 
such limitations in the grant itself, rather than some four years 
after the dissolution, aud after continuing use of the right of 
way as granted, seeking court assistance to prevent defendant 
from making full use in the customary manner of the way 
granted. 
[6] Insofar as construction of the grant of the right of 
way is concerned section 1069 of the Civil Code declares that 
"A grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except 
that a reservation in any grant ... is to be interpreted in favor 
of the grantor." "[T] he rules applicable to the construction . 
of deeds generally apply with full force and effect to instru- i 
ments conveying easements or other similar rights or privi-
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leges." (Eastman v. Piper (1924), 68 Cal.App. 554, 561 [6] 
[229 P. 1002] ; 17 Cal.Jur.2d 102, § 10.) 
[7] One of such rules is that if the language of a deed is 
plain, certain and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor 
surrounding facts and circumstances will be con:,idcred to add 
to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate 
conveyed. (See Joerger v. Pacific Gas &; Electric Co. (1929), 
207 Cal. 8, 32 [26] [276 P. 1017] ; Fitzgerald v. County of 
Modoc (1913), 164 Cal. 493, 497 [129 P. 794,44 L.R.A. N.S. 
1229] ; Pinsky v. Sloat (1955), 130 Cal.App.2d 579, 588-58!) 
[3-11J [279 P.2d 584] ; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856, 1860; 13 
Cal.Jur.2d 521-522, § 122, 18 Cal.Jur.2d 737-738, § 255; id. 
768-770, § 278.) Smith v. Worn (1892),93 Cal. 206, 214 [28 
P. 944J, relied upon by plaintiff, in which evidence of sur-
rounding circumstances was considered by the court, involved 
construction of the very language used in the deed conveying 
the right of way, to determine whether it might be obstructed 
by gates or bars, and is not persuasive to the contrary of the 
conclusion we have stated. 
[8] There appears to be nothing unclear, uncertain or 
ambiguous, at least as relevant to the issues of this case, in 
the words "For Value Received, Adolph D. Laux and Joyce 
H. Laux ... grant to William J. Freed and Bertell F. Freed 
" . as Joint Tenants, all the real property situate in the County 
of Colusa ... described as follows: A right of way over a road 
as presently constructed along the East Branch of Sand Creek, 
in the East half of Section 18" etc. Perhaps one might argue 
ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of "as Joint 
Tenants" but that criticism does not apply to "A right of way 
over a road as presently constructed along the East Branch of 
Sand Creek" etc. But even if we assume that in some situa-
tions the facts surrounding the execution of the deed may be 
shown in evidence to explain the language used in a deed, that 
is not the purpose or objective of the plaintiffs here. 
There is not even a suggestion of overreaching of plaintiffs 
by defendants. Nor is there any contention that defendants 
misled plaintiffs or misrepresented the terms of the dissolution 
of the partnership. Plaintiff Adolph Laux himself prepared 
the deed. He prepared it, according to his testimony, after dis-
cussion with defendant William Freed of various requests for 
further and differing rights of way. 
Section 1066 of the Civil Code specifies that "Grants are 
to be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general, 
except so far as is otherwise provided in this article." (Sec-
) 
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tions 1066 through 1072 constitute "this article.") Section 
1625 provides, "The execution of a contract in writing, 
whether the law requires it to he written or not, supersedes 
all the negotiations or stipulatioJls concerning its matter ",hidl 
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument." 
[9] Further, an instrument in writ.ing is construed most 
strongly against the party who drafted it or caused it to he 
drafted. (Civ. Code, § 1654; Taylor v. J. B. Hill Co. (1948), 
31 Cal.2d 373, 374 [1] [189 P.2d 258]; Estate of Rule (1944), 
25 Ca1.2d 1, 13 [8] [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319] ; 12 Cal. 
Jur.2d 363.) [10] Plaintiff's own testimony here shows 
that the intention of the parties was to make (and the law 
prescribing the duties of fiduciaries would require) a substan-
tially equal division of the property and equipment which 
they owned as partners, that following the toss of the coin 
defendant had requested two further rights of way in addi-
tion to the existing one and that the parties had negotiated 
and argued out the matter including use for deer hunting, 
and that plaintiff caused t~e deed to the right of way to be 
prepared in the form hereinabove quoted and deposited witb 
the title company.3 If plaintiff had intended (and the partners 
had agreed) that defenuant himself, and hunters invited or 
licensed by defendant, were to be barred from use of the 
existing right of way-the sole right of way granted by plain-
tiff to defendant-it was incumbent on the plaintiff to have 
caused the deed he prepared and delivered to so state. In any 
event, under the circumstances shown here, the prior negotia-
tions which preceded the written oot'ument were merged into 
and superseded by the writing, and cannot now be resorted to 
by plaintiff to so limit the terms of the grant as to deprive 
his former partner of the right to continue using the road as 
it had been used consistently before the dissolution of the part-
nership. 
This conclusion is further supported by the provision of 
'Plaintiff testi1ied that before the right of way deed was finally pre-
pared and delivered to defendant. he Rnd defendant hlld three or four 
conversations concerning the matter; that defendant told plaintiff "that 
the present road wasn't going to be adequate flnougb ... to transport 
the hunters across my property to get to tIl(' rjdges on top ... on his 
part of the range" (italics added): defendant wanted "three rights 
of way • • . He wanted first the right of way as was then existing • . • 
And he also wanted one that went around the Ble\'jns bouse .•• To 
the east of the house. [And] He wllnted another one that went over 
the hill on the west" but plaintiff "told him no." Plaintiff himself 
"went into Ed Barrell's office and drew up tlle right of wily ••• Q. And 
the deed to the right of way was also plnced by :rou with the title com-
pany. is that right! A. Yes." 
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8rction 806 of the Civil Codc that" The extent of a servitude is 
determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the 
enjoyment by which it was acquired. " [ 11] And in Tiffany, 
Real Propr]"ty, volume 3 (3d ed.), section 803, pages 322-323, 
it is said: "A grant in general terms of an easement of way 
will onlinarily be construed as creating a general right of way 
eapable of use in eonnection with the dominant tenement for 
a II rel1>;0118 ble purposes .... " [ 12 ] Also, in Thompson on 
Heal Proprrty, volume 2 (Perm. ed.), sections 577-578, pages 
183-] 86, thc rule is stated as follows: "A grant of a right of 
way unrestricted as to purpose is a grant of a way to be used 
for any purpose whatever .... " (See also 38 Cal.L.Rev. 444; 
28 C .. J .S. 767-768, § 87; id. 769, § 90; 17A Am.Jur. 727-729, 
§ 119: Drexler v. Hufnagel (1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 606, 60!) 
[173 P.2d 677].) We conclude that the record does not sup-
port the limitations imposed by injunction on the right of 
way granted to defendants. 
For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the record 
fails to. provide a legally sufficient basis for judicially writing 
into plaintiffs' deed of an unlimited right of way, the re-
strictions embodied in the injunction. 
The portions of the judgment appealed from are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and 
Whit!', .L, concurred. 
TRA Y~On, J.-I concur in the judgment but wish to add 
that I adhere to the views with respect to the so-called rule 
against admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret apparently 
ul\amlliguous written instruments set forth in my concurring 
opiuion ill U11iversal Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co., 
20 Cal.2d 75], 776 [128 P.2d 665], and dissenting opinion in 
Esfate of Rule, 25 Ca1.2d 1, 20-22 r152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 
13Hl]. (Sl'e also Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co., 31 Ca1.2d 
300, 30G, footnote [188 P.2d 470].) Its fatuity is demon-
strated b~' holdings that the conflicting contentions of the 
partirs as to the meaning of a written instrument alone supply 
the mnhigllity necessary to take the rule out of play. (Bene-
ficial eic. IllS. Co. v. Kurt Hitke &- Co., 46 Ca1.2d 517, 524 
[2n7 P.2d 428] ; Chagtain v. Belmont, 43 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [271 
P.2d 498); Televis1'oll A"is Productions, Inc. v. Jerry Fair-
banl;s, Inc., 164 Ca1.App.2d R42, 848 [331 P.2d 117] ; Califor-
nia E111p. efc. Com. v. Waltf1"S, H4 Cal.App.2d 554, 559 [14!) 
P.2d 17).) IJitigatioll as to the meaning of language arises 
) 
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only from disputes as to meaning; a rule applicable only when 
no dispute exists is of no assistance in resolving a dispute 
that does exist. 
The rule is of no assistance whatever in determining the 
meaning of the deed in this case. Its meaning can only be made 
plain by extrinsic evidence. . Certainly it is logic run riot to 
rely on extrinsic evidence to establish that the meaning is plain 
and then to hold that such evidence cannot be considered 
because the meaning is plain. The suitability of defendants' 
land for deer hunting was established by the extrinsic evidence 
of its use for that purpose both before and after the execution 
of the deed in question. In the absence of evidence establish-
ing that the meaning the parties attached to the language of 
the grant excluded use of the easement to gain access for hunt-
ing, the grant in general terms must be interpreted as per-
mitting that use. (Drexler v. Hufnagel, 76 Cal.App.2d 606, 
609 [173 P.2d 677] ; see Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. 
Co., 17 Ca1.2d 576, 582 [110 P.2d 983, 133 A.L.R. 1186]; 
3 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), § 803, pp. 322-323.) 
There is no evidence in the record .to support a restrictive 
interpretation of the deed. It is true that plaintiff testified 
that before the property was partitioned, the parties orally 
agreed that "whoever got the back half of the range should 
have a right of way up through the property for the purpose 
of caring for his cattle in winter time, or hauling hay up to 
them, or haul material, whatever he needed to care for his 
property, in maintaining fences, and so forth." As an agree-
ment, this oral understanding was superseded by the subse-
quently executed deed. (Civ. Code, § 1625; Hotle v. Millet·, 
51 Ca1.2d 541,546 [344 P.2d 849] ; see 3 Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 574, pp. 222-223.) As extrinsic evidence of the meaning of 
the deed, it does not support the trial court's interpretation. 
Thus, the oral understanding did not expressly exclude access 
for deer hunting, and other testimony of plaintiff establishes 
that the parties were not in 8.","'I"eement as to the scope of the 
easement intended immediately before the deed was executed. 
At that time defendant wished additional rights of way to 
facilitate hunting, and plaintiff wished to prohibit use of the 
right of way by hunters altogether. This controversy was re-
solved when the parties completed the dissolution of their 
partnership by the execution and acceptance of the deed grant-
ing the right of way. Under these circumstances the deed 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting access to de-
fendants' land for deer hunting, an existing and reasonable 
) 
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use of the land. In view of the controversy, had the parties 
agreed on a more restrictive use, surely they would have 
adopted language so providing. 
To attempt to support this conclusion by holding that the 
very evidence on which it is based may not be considered is 
logically indefensible. Moreover, the giving of lip service to 
the rule that an apparently plain and unambiguous meaning 
must govern, invites the error that the trial court committed 
in this case, namely, rewriting a written instrument. Implicit 
in the statement that when the language of a written instru-
ment is "plain, certain and unambiguous" extrinsic evidence 
will not be considered "to add to, detract from, or vary its 
terms" is the idea that if the language is not "plain, certain 
and unambiguous," extrinsic evidence may be considered for 
those purposes. Whether or not the language of a written 
instrument appears, "plain, certain and unambiguous," ex-
trinsic evidence is not admissible to· "add to, detract from, or 
vary its terms." It is admissible to determine what those 
terms are. (Barham v. Barham, 33 Ca1.2d 416, 422-423 [202 
P.2d 289].) The court must determine the true meaning of 
the instrument in the light of the evidence available. It can 
neither exclude extrinsic evidence relevant to that determina-
tion nor invoke such evidence to write a new or different 
instrument. 
